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Enhancing Cryptographic Security by Partial Key Management
ABSTRACT
Cryptographic security can degrade over time due to attackers using more powerful
hardware or more sophisticated software. To maintain security, cryptographic machinery is
replaced or strengthened as and when weaknesses are found. However, updating certain
cryptographic components is infeasible or expensive, resulting in updates that either don’t occur
or are delayed. This disclosure describes techniques to enhance cryptographic security by
updating portions of a cryptographic system when updating cryptographic parameters is only
partially possible. Authenticating data (auth-data) sent by the un-updateable component during
normal operation is used to deliver new and upgraded security parameters to secure
communication. Security degradation resulting from the inability to effect an end-to-end update
is limited to the immediate vicinity of the un-updateable component. The described techniques
can be used to improve security of Internet-of-Things (IoT) device communication.
KEYWORDS
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● Bluetooth beacon
● Accessory tracking
● Cryptographic key
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BACKGROUND
Security based on cryptographic protocols can degrade over time due to advances in
cryptanalysis or due to attackers using more powerful hardware and/or more sophisticated
software. To maintain security, cryptographic machinery is replaced or strengthened as and when
cryptographic weaknesses are found. However, updating certain cryptographic components may
be infeasible or expensive, resulting in updates that either don’t occur or are delayed. Examples
include cryptographic components in the field; components that belong to end users; components
that lack remote secure update capability; field components that require a hardware patch or
replacement; etc.

Fig. 1: Example cryptographic application with a relatively weak field device
Consider the example of Fig. 1, which illustrates a wireless Internet-of-Things (IoT)
device (102) owned by an owner (104). During setup, the owner shares a key k with the IoT
device. The IoT device uses k and the time t to generate and advertise over a beacon an
ephemeral public key gx(k,t), which also serves as an ephemeral ID (EID), e.g., a Diffie-Hellman
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(DH) public key whose secret part is known to the owner. The IoT device emits the beacon
(which can be, e.g., a Bluetooth low energy (BLE) beacon) periodically, enabling it to be located
if it gets lost.
When in close proximity to the IoT device, the owner can readily locate the device using
its beacon. However, once the IoT device is deployed in the field (or is lost), the owner may be
too far away from the IoT device to be able to directly receive its beacon. An observer (106, e.g.,
a passerby with a wireless connection) can receive the beacon and assist in locating the lost IoT
device as follows. At periodic intervals, e.g., once a day, the owner shares with a server (108) a
table of EID hashes. The nearby observer uses the EID received from the IoT device and their
own ephemeral public key to anonymously encrypt the location and send a hash of the EID and
the encrypted location to the server. Using the table of EID hashes, the server associates the
received hashed EID with the owner but, not knowing k, is unable to decrypt the encrypted
location. The owner accesses the server, downloads the encrypted location, and decrypts it. The
identity of the observer is protected from the owner and the server, while the location of the
observer (and hence of the IoT device) is protected from decryption at the server.
As explained earlier, based on the capabilities of potential attackers, the cryptographic
specification for the beacon can periodically be upgraded. For example, the size of the ellipticcurve-based ephemeral public key advertised by the IoT device on its beacon can be increased to
make the IoT device and the encrypted location resistant to attacks. However, the IoT device,
being in the field, may not be amenable to being updated to a more robust cryptographic
standard.
In general, cryptographic techniques evolve, and cryptography can become out-of-date. A
cryptographic system is changed to accommodate new cryptography, e.g., with stronger, longer
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keys, but not all computing elements (e.g., IoT devices) in the system can be changed (updated)
at the same time. To enable old, un-updated systems to work with new, up-to-date systems, the
conventional strategy is to enable backward compatibility: The new system is expected to
interact with the old system and adjust to it.
However, the current practice of backward compatibility makes it so that the new system
degrades itself to work with the old cryptography of the old system, e.g., in an old-system mode.
This means that weak cryptography continues to be used, well past the system update, due to
asynchrony in the update across components in the system. This is often unacceptable as a
security principle.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes partial key management, e.g., techniques to enhance
cryptographic security by updating portions of a cryptographic system when updating
cryptographic parameters is only partially possible. Security degradation that can result from the
inability to effect an end-to-end update is limited to the immediate vicinity of the un-updateable
component. The techniques are applicable in particular to the Internet-of-Things (IoT), where an
un-updateable device often communicates with another component (the owner) via another
nearby component (the gateway or observer) and the cloud. In such scenarios, security
degradation is limited to the communication between the un-updateable device and the gateway.
Effectively, the techniques achieve backward compatibility, but backward compatibility
does not merely revert the system to an older security level; rather, data sent from an un-updated
component during its normal operation is utilized to enhance the security of the rest of the
system so that only the part of the system communicating directly with the non-updateable
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component remains with the weaker security while the security in the rest of the system is
enhanced.
Unlike conventional approaches, end-to-end system security isn’t degraded to
accommodate an un-updated component. The described techniques enable the sustenance and
advance of cryptographic security for longer durations, even across cryptographic updates that
don’t reach every component in the system.
Specifically, referring to the example of Fig. 1, the owner sends periodically to the server
for each EID that the beacon advertises within that period a new and stronger ephemeral public
key signed with the private key associated with the EID, alongside the EID hash. When an
observer (serving as gateway) receives the EID of the IoT device, it sends the hash of the EID to
the server. The server locates the respective signed new key and sends it to the observer. The
observer verifies the signature using the EID, encrypts their location with the new key and sends
it to the server. Thus, rather than using the EID to encrypt the observer's location (as is
conventional), the EID is used to verify the signature on a new and stronger key. To prevent an
attacker from forging a signature using a brute force attack on the weaker old key used to
generate the signature, the observer sets a short timeout after which it refuses to accept the new
key. In this manner, cryptographic security is maintained without modifying the IoT device or its
beacon.
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Fig. 2: Enhancing cryptographic security by updating portions of a cryptographic system
Fig. 2 illustrates enhancing cryptographic security by updating portions of a
cryptographic system when updating cryptographic parameters is only partially possible. A
device (202) is in the field and lacks internet connectivity. Therefore, it cannot be updated to the
latest cryptographic standard. The device can, however, broadcast wirelessly over a limited
range, using, e.g., BLE beacons. The device is owned by an owner (204) device that has internet
connectivity and is capable of the latest cryptographic standard. The owner and the device
communicate securely using one-way or two-way communication, which is readily possible
when they are in close proximity, but is only indirectly possible (if at all) when they are not.
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Initially, when the owner and the device are in close proximity, common secrets are
exchanged or otherwise generated (210). Once deployed in the field (or lost), the device and the
owner are no longer in close proximity to each other and cannot communicate directly. Indirect
device-owner communication is made possible via a gateway (206) that is in proximity to the
device. The gateway has internet connectivity and the latest cryptographic standard. The gateway
can communicate with the device using its communication medium, e.g., BLE. The gateway may
be ad hoc, e.g., not fixed, and there may be times when there is no gateway near the device. For
example, the gateway can be a Bluetooth-enabled smartphone of a person who happens to be
close to or walk by the device. The gateway cannot share secrets with the owner or the device
nor can it access their public keys, if such public keys are at all used. Thus, there is no a priori
secure communication channel between the gateway and the owner.
At some point, to forestall attackers with newer and more powerful technology,
cryptographic standards are generally upgraded. However, upgrading or replacing the device is
infeasible or expensive. As shown below, the inability to upgrade the device need not result in a
degradation of end-to-end security. Rather, degradation can be limited to the immediate
proximity of the device, e.g., to the device-gateway communication, while maintaining
upgraded, secure gateway-owner communication as described below.
The owner periodically sends to a server (208) for each EID the beacon is expected to
advertise during the period a new and stronger ephemeral public key signed with the private key
associated with the EID alongside the EID hash (212). The device uses the key k and the time t to
generate and broadcast over its beacon (214) an ephemeral public key gx(k,t), which also serves as
an ephemeral ID (EID).

Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2022

8

Defensive Publications Series, Art. 5599 [2022]

When the gateway receives an EID from the IoT device (216), it sends a hash of the EID
to the server (218). The server locates the respective signed new key (220) and sends it to the
gateway (222). The gateway verifies the signature using the EID (224), encrypts its location with
the new key, and sends the encrypted location to the server (226). The owner retrieves the
encrypted location from the server and decrypts it (228).
To prevent an attacker from forging a signature using a brute force attack on the weaker
old key used to generate the signature, the gateway sets a short timeout after which it refuses to
accept the new key. Effectively, the owner uses the auth-data, e.g., the ephemeral DH publickey, which is common to itself and the device, to authenticate and possibly also encrypt a new
key, and to send it to the gateway (or, e.g., apply secure key exchange with the gateway). In this
manner, cryptographic security is maintained without modifying the device.
Generally, the techniques limit degradation to the immediate proximity of an unupdateable component or device by:
● identifying data, known as auth-data, which is sent during normal operation (or can be
sent upon interactive command) by the un-updateable device such that auth-data enables
the authentication of other data;
● delivering to the gateway new security parameters authenticated by auth-data or by using
auth-data to securely negotiate new security parameters; and
● securing the communication between the gateway and the owner using the new security
parameters.
Auth-data can be based on cryptographic keys that do not provide long-term security. In
such cases, authentication is performed within a specified, relatively short, time period. In
addition to authenticating new security parameters, it is also possible to encrypt them.
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Auth-data can exist even if authentication is a priori not needed or used. For example, in
some cases, encrypted data using keys known to the owner may be used as auth-data.
In many real systems, such auth-data exist as a result of the system using some form of
cryptography. For concreteness, consider a system where two entities A and B communicate
with each other, where A which is not updateable sends and receives data through another entity
G (G stands for gateway), where G may not be fixed or known in advance. In this case data sent
by A as part of its normal operation and which can be considered as Auth-data include a public
key (or ephemeral public key) for which B knows the private portion or a pseudorandom string
that B can generate by itself. Examples of the latter include symmetrically encrypted data or
message authentication code (if B knows the plaintext data or if the plaintext data is from a small
domain), randomly generated ephemeral IDs, etc.
Attack model
Consider again for concreteness the scenario above with A, B and G (that is, where A and
B communicate by the gateway G near A and where A is non-updateable). Assume also that the
system is upgraded and because A is non-updateable, the technique disclosed above has been
implemented into the system using some form of Auth-data . Below, attacks on the disclosed
system in different scenarios and different types of Auth-data are considered.
If there is no attack on the A-G link, the end-to-end communication between A and B via
G is secure. This is the typical case since A and G are in proximity to each other.
Attacks on the A-G link can also be thwarted, as follows. Consider the case of an
eavesdropping attacker on the A-G link which tries to use the data it observes on the A-G link to
learn auth-data in order to deceive G by playing the role of B. Note that such an eavesdropping
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attacker can only attack the system if auth-data is based on symmetric cryptography. Even so,
there are ways to thwart such an attack, as follows:
1. B can send authenticated new security parameters (or apply its part of the key exchange
protocol) before auth-data is broadcast.
2. B can prepare authenticated new security parameters before auth-data is broadcast and
request a secure time-server to sign the new security parameters.
The system may also be able to thwart attacks in which the attacker is capable of
applying man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks on the A-G link. For example, this is possible if G
is able to verify authenticity of Auth-data.
Note also that for the device-finding system such as the one described above, an active
MITM attack is not really useful since the attacker is close to the beacon and may have other
means (such as GPS) to find out the location (which in the device-finding application is the
secret the system protects).
Below are further example applications, additional to the above-described, device-finding
application.
Example application: telemetric data
A crowdsourced system enables a beacon to send telemetric data and other information to
the beacon’s owner when the owner and the beacon are not in proximity to each other as follows.
●

The beacon advertises an ephemeral ID (EID) that changes every few minutes (so as to
not be tracked) and encrypted data. Both the ephemeral ID and encrypted data are
generated using symmetric cryptography.

● A nearby smartphone (or other device) acting as a gateway picks the EID and the
encrypted data and forwards them to a central server. Effectively, this is a mobile ad-hoc
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network, typically implemented in a layer away from the user and automatically
performed by the phone.
● The server, in turn, associates the EID with the beacon’s owner (using a table containing
all EIDs expected to be advertised by all beacons that day).
● The owner can thereafter access the server, get the encrypted data of its beacon and
decrypt it.
Modifications to handle un-updateable beacons: If one or more beacons are un-updateable due to
their being in the field or being away from their owners, the following can be implemented.
● Being pseudorandom, the encrypted data and/or the EID can be used as the auth-data. (If
the EID is used as part of auth-data then the server must be made to work with hashed
EIDs rather than the EIDs, so as to break symmetry between the producing devices and
the checking server.) For example, once a day, the owner can upload to the server a table
including, for each expected EID, a new key (or other parameters) encrypted and
authenticated using the secret associated with the auth-data associated with that EID.
● Upon getting an EID and encrypted data from a beacon, a gateway now forwards only the
EID (or the hashed EID) to the server. The server finds the respective new key (in
encrypted and authenticated form) and sends it to the gateway. The gateway authenticates
and decrypts the new key using auth-data, uses it to secure the beacon’s encrypted data
(so the data would be doubly encrypted) and sends the result to the server.
Example application: transport layer security (TLS)
A cipher suite agreed upon between a client A and server B in TLS may not necessarily
be strong enough since the server, the client or both may not support a cipher suite of a desired
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strength, as a result of flawed implementation or for other reasons. Suppose client A doesn’t
support a sufficiently strong cipher suite, and that it is un-updateable.
Modifications to handle an un-updateable client: Leveraging the fact that each data packet
exchanged between the client and server goes through multiple hops, the server G (gateway) in
the first hop from A can negotiate with B a stronger cipher suite (or agree on
encryption/authentication outside the TLS protocol). To authenticate (and possibly encrypt) the
new cipher suite, B and G may be able to use the session’s encrypted data or MAC as auth-data.
The result is that each packet is protected by the weaker cipher suite only in the first hop
(between A and G) and is protected by both the weaker inner cipher suite and the stronger outer
suite between G and B. If G is unable to negotiate a suitable cipher suite with B as well, then the
server G′, G′ being the next hop after G, may be able to negotiate a suitable cipher suite with B.
The goal is to minimize the prefix of exposure. Unlike services that break TLS to serve as
content readers (or middleboxes [3]), security is increased on the suffix of the route (rest of the
system) without decrypting any ciphertext, old or new.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to enhance cryptographic security by updating
portions of a cryptographic system when updating cryptographic parameters is only partially
possible. Authenticating data (auth-data) sent by the un-updateable component during normal
operation is used to deliver new and upgraded security parameters to secure communication.
Security degradation resulting from the inability to effect an end-to-end update is limited to the
immediate vicinity of the un-updateable component. The described techniques can be used to
improve security of Internet-of-Things (IoT) device communication.
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